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THE LIMITED CASE FOR
DISCRIMINATION’S LEGALITY
AVIHAY DORFMAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
Antidiscrimination law in market settings is asymmetrically structured.1
Employers may not discriminate against would-be (and current) employees; no
obligation of this sort runs in the opposite direction.2 Similar asymmetry holds in
the housing market as antidiscrimination duties stop when house-seekers
discriminate against landlords or owners.3 And more generally, some providers
of goods or services may not be allowed to refuse to serve customers, though the
latter is at unrestrained liberty to discriminate against these providers.4
There is nothing inherently problematic in giving horizontal interactions (that
is, among private persons) an asymmetric cast. Many legal schemes in and around
market settings feature some such asymmetry—for instance, laws regulating
disclosure, product safety, and workplace safety focus almost single-mindedly on
one party in the transaction, to the near exclusion of the other. Information
asymmetries and power imbalances, more generally, can explain many of these
cases. Asymmetry in laws governing horizontal interactions can be discerned
even beyond market settings, as when negligence law, reacting to the normative
priority of bodily integrity over liberty of action, enforces different standards of
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1. See, e.g., TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 195–214 (2015)
(asserting that antidiscrimination duties are “typically imposed on the state, on employers on landlords,
and on providers of goods and services” rather than on employees, tenants, and consumers because the
“liberty costs and expressive dangers are too high” for the latter group). For more on the structural claim,
see infra Part II.
2. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defines employment discrimination in
terms of discrimination by an “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
3. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f) (2018) (declaring discrimination in
connection with selling and renting houses illegal).
4. For instance, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination or segregation in
places of public accommodation” but in fact limits this prohibition to discrimination and segregation by
places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. That is, the Act focuses exclusively on the
responsibility of sellers, to the exclusion of buyers. See id. § 2000a(b) (listing business establishments and
commercial bodies serving “the public” as places of public accommodation).
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due care on risk-creators, on the one hand, and on risk-takers, on the other.5
What all these, and many other, examples share is the commitment to subjecting
the terms of private law interactions to a standard of substantive equality—that
is, the law takes difference seriously and, so, resists treating the interacting parties
as formally equal.
What might explain the asymmetric structure of antidiscrimination law in
market settings? In these pages, I focus on what seems to me to be the more
challenging prong of this question—why, if at all, should the likes of the
employees, home-seekers, and consumers be relieved of the antidiscrimination
duties that typically apply to their counterparties?6 My answer is normative and
a-historical.7 That is, I look for an explanation of the asymmetric structure of
antidiscrimination law that is neither a way station toward nor an imperfect
substitute for a wholly symmetric regime of antidiscrimination law. Put
affirmatively, I seek to explore what, if anything, could support a liberal legal
order’s reluctance to impose antidiscrimination duties on the likes of consumers,
employees, and home-seekers.8 I do that by distinguishing between two different
ways in which consumers engage in market activities: Transacting bilaterally and
transacting multilaterally. By bilateral transacting, I mean to refer to a consumer
deciding whether to buy a particular product from a particular seller at a
particular time—say, the consumer may consider whether or not to make a oneoff stop at the bookstore on her way back home from work. By contrast, a
transaction is multilateral in its economic structure when the consumer’s choice
features a class-wide dimension so that deciding not to purchase from one seller
is instantly supplanted by a decision to consider buying the thing from another
seller. Thus, multilateral transactions feature a consumer seeking to buy a
product from any one of many potential sellers who offer the product for sale—
say, forming a plan to purchase a certain book from any single seller who happens
to sell this book. I find limited support for the liberal reluctance to impose
antidiscrimination duties on consumers: Discrimination arising in connection
5. See Avihay Dorfman, Negligence and Accommodation, 22 LEGAL THEORY 77, 77 (2016)
(arguing that “defendants are expected to discharge an objectively fixed amount of care, whereas
plaintiffs are generally assessed using a subjective measurement of reasonable care”).
6. I take a first stab at the case for imposing antidiscrimination duties on these counterparties
elsewhere. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework,
37 LAW & PHIL. 171, 201 (2018) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Justice] (arguing that “the justice
requirement to respect others as substantively free and equal individuals can sometimes be adequately
discharged only if the relevant private persons are held responsible for its realization”); Hanoch Dagan
& Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1395–96 (2016) (asserting that the
private law system should “openly embrace the liberal commitment . . . to substantive equality”).
7. For a penetrating historical account, see generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). I have criticized Ackerman’s account for obscuring the
(normatively) important distinction between two conceptions of equality that might underlie the civil
rights revolution—relational and distributional equality. See generally Avihay Dorfman, Discovering
Private Law: Two Comments on Bruce Ackerman, We The People: The Civil Rights Revolution, 13
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2016).
8. By liberal legal order, I mean laws whose basic commitment is to treat people as free and equal
persons.
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with bilateral transacting should not count as a legal wrong. However, the liberal
case for the legality of discrimination does not apply to multilateral transacting,
which means that there is no principled basis to relieve consumers engaging in
the latter market activity of antidiscrimination duties.
This is a normative argument, as I asserted, but it is normative in a special
way. Commonly, the study of antidiscrimination law’s asymmetric structure
proceeds by identifying a fundamental value—for instance, autonomy or
welfare—followed by an attempt to determine what could be required by a
commitment to this value within a particular sphere of action (say, in market
settings or in a certain subset thereof).9 The requirement generated by this
analysis would then serve as a basis for assessing the current law’s asymmetric
structure and, in particular, its insistently favorable treatment of the consumer
side of the interaction. The assumption widely shared by these accounts is that
the legal and economic forms of market interaction are akin to dependent
variables in the moral analysis leading up to the recommendation to revise or
preserve the law in the appropriate way. On this approach, the asymmetry at issue
is questioned from a purely moral perspective without appreciating that the
question, and its answer, cannot be understood apart from the legal and the
economic construction of the moral landscape. By contrast, I argue that the law,
together with the transaction structures to which it gives rise, construct the moral
landscape, rather than merely reflect, accommodate, or make it more
determinate. As a result, the key to assessing the asymmetric structure of
antidiscrimination law lies in understanding how the law of voluntary
undertakings with its doctrines of offer and invitation to make offers, along with
the structure of transactions to which this law gives rise, make a difference in
moral space.
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part II sets the scene by explaining
the sense in which the asymmetry in question is structural. In the course of doing
so, I seek to deny certain widely accepted explanations of the asymmetry, such as
those emphasizing that sellers often hold themselves open to the public, that they
should be seen as quasi-public officials, that they are the Goliaths of the market,
or that consumers possess a right to do wrong. Part III shows how a certain
concern for free agency can make some sense of the asymmetric structure of
antidiscrimination law—more precisely, it develops a liberal case for the legality
of discrimination in what I call a bilateral transaction structure. Part IV takes up
the scope of this case—that is, whose free agency trumps the demands of
antidiscrimination law and under what conditions.
9. For a very thoughtful analysis, see Katherine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by
Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 223, 227 (2016), which argues that a commitment to efficiency would
logically lead to a blanket ban on discrimination by customers, but would ultimately be more inefficient
and counterproductive. Other important contributions include, among many others, Michael Blake, The
Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017 (2006); Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair
Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349 (2017); Richard H. McAdams, The Need for a General Theory of
Discrimination: A Comment on Katherine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102
IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 335 (2017).
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Two methodological points before I begin. First, I develop a liberal case for
the legality of discrimination in market settings. To do so, I presuppose that these
settings can be studied in some measure of isolation from other partially
overlapping social spheres, such as the spheres of intimacy and democratic
politics. Note that I am not making the strong claim that patterns of
discrimination in market settings and the legal response to them are, strictly
speaking, distinctive. After all, the legal institutions that govern market
interactions, contract and property in particular, also establish non-market forms
of human interactions (for instance, a private owner who grants permission to
others, strangers included, to make free-of-charge use of her resource for certain
recreational purposes). Instead, my discussion presupposes a weaker claim,
namely, that the market is an especially interesting—and important—sphere of
interpersonal, voluntary undertakings in modern, liberal-egalitarian societies.
This general point is reinforced by the challenge of defending asymmetry in
matters of discrimination in market settings. Indeed, it is one thing to support
forms of asymmetry in vertical interactions between political authorities and their
constituents; quite another to make sense of the law’s asymmetrical treatment of
horizontal interactions, especially when participants on both sides of these
interactions exhibit (at least sometimes) morally indistinguishable repugnant
behavior.
Second, by focusing on antidiscrimination law and its structure, I seek to
distinguish between “the antidiscrimination law” of this or that polity and
“antidiscrimination law” as an idea of a legal institution shared, with some
variations, among all or many liberal legal orders.10 To this extent, I treat
antidiscrimination law as private-law theorists often approach the subject matter
of contract, tort, or property. Rather than zooming in on the contract, tort, or
property law, say, of a particular jurisdiction in a particular time, they assume,
and indeed reclaim, an idea of—and for—contract, tort, or property. This is not
to say that there must be an integrated idea of antidiscrimination law. However,
the asymmetry on which my argument focuses is so overwhelmingly present in
the legal schemes of many liberal legal orders, described in this Article, as to
justify a prima facie belief in antidiscrimination law as an idea, or a repository of
ideas, implicit in these schemes.
II
SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION’S
ASYMMETRY
In this Part, I seek to explain the sense in which the asymmetry of
antidiscrimination law is structural. It is structural, I argue, in the sense that it
abstracts from both the economic conditions of the market and conceptions of a
10. Although illiberal legal orders (that is, orders whose basic commitments are at odds with treating
those subject to them as free and equal persons) may, for some reason, prohibit discrimination in market
settings, I shall set them aside for the purposes of this Article.
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good life of (most) market participants. By “economic conditions,” I mean a set
of factors that define the actual workings of a market in a particular time and
place. These would include the number, size, and power of the relevant actors, as
well as the extra-market norms that superimpose on market transactions (such as
national or religious ethos). By “conceptions of a good life,” I refer to the
particular ways in which participants integrate their market experience into their
more general pursuit of meaning. The significance of these two abstractions
comes to this: The asymmetrical application of antidiscrimination law does not
reflect, or even loosely track, the most commonly-held views on the empirical
and normative differences between the interacting parties. This approach leads
to my argument in Parts III and IV—that the asymmetry in question cannot be
specified without reference to the legal and economic form of the market
transaction. And as I show presently, it can be partially justified and partially
criticized by reference to such formality.
A. David-and-Goliath Dynamics?
Singling out consumers or employees for favorable treatment cannot be
supported by empirical differences between the interacting parties. Market
interactions are not necessarily—indeed, not even typically—about a David-andGoliath rivalry. Many sellers and employers are anything but Goliaths (or any
other variation on the common law’s categories of common carriers and
innkeepers); that said, they may still be subject to certain antidiscrimination
duties.11 Consider, for example, a cafeteria owned by a sole proprietor.12 At the
same time, consumers and employees are not subject to such duties, regardless of
their market influence as individuals acting separately or in concert. More
generally, the asymmetry cuts across familiar distinctions such as the one between
artificial and natural persons. Accordingly, consumers, employees, and homeseekers are not relieved of antidiscrimination duties by virtue of their status as
natural (and private) persons. Indeed, sellers and employers may owe these
duties even when they possess a similar status.
B. Is Discrimination Predominantly Harmful to Consumers, Not Sellers?
This way out rests on historical grounds. I say historical grounds because, in
principle, the adverse consequences of discriminatory practices can visit either
side in a market interaction. Discrimination against consumers and employees

11. It is true that “small” landlords may be treated more leniently than most other landlords. The
Mrs. Murphy exception is a case in point, but it seems that the reason for this treatment has to do with
the reality of co-housing, rather than the landlord’s economic size or market power. See 42 U.S.C. §
3603(b)(2) (2018) (exempting dwellings occupied by four or less families when the landlord occupies one
of the units or rooms in the dwelling from antidiscrimination laws applicable in renting or selling
property). See also Avihay Dorfman, No Exclusion 1, 31 (Nov. 11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3488149 [https://perma.cc/8GCE-2TV7] (asserting
that a landlord sharing a small dwelling with a tenant “implicates the parties in forms of intimacy and
rapport as they literally share a living space”).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2) (subjecting “any . . . cafeteria” to non-discrimination duties).
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can bring about harmful consequences ranging from economic setbacks, to social
stigma, to humiliation. However, these and other adverse consequences could
also result from discrimination against some sellers and employers (including,
most dramatically, sole proprietors, small firms, and businesses managed by
members of a minority community). So it has to be a historical observation to the
effect that consumers (and employees) have been the most immediate victims of
discrimination. Against the backdrop of this observation, it is not surprising that
antidiscrimination law identifies sellers (and employers) as the source of the
problem.13 Or so the historical argument might go.
However, historical and present cases suggest otherwise. For instance,
although discrimination against Black people during Jim Crow is often associated
with White sellers excluding Black consumers, studies show that Black-owned
businesses fell victim to systemic discrimination by White consumers.14 As the
influential Black leader W. E. B. Du Bois suspected at the end of the nineteenth
century, “it is [the] density of Negro population in main that gives the Negro
business-man his best chance.”15 His suspicion would soon become real as Blackowned businesses during the early twentieth century had to rely almost
exclusively on Black clientele in the face of discrimination by White consumers.16
This is, unfortunately, unsurprising, as the morally repugnant behavior associated
with discrimination in the market need not run in one particular direction; rather,
the class of victims of discrimination cuts across the buyer-seller distinction.
C. Do Service- and Good-Providers Hold Themselves Out as Serving the
Public?17
It might be tempting to attribute an egalitarian undertaking to these providers
and, so, to explain antidiscrimination law in terms of a backup plan in case they

13. To be sure, this is not an explanation as to why consumers are not targeted, too.
14. JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK AMERICANS: A
RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 144–45, 147 (1991) (finding that Black-owned businesses
experienced discrimination by White customers with the enactment of Jim Crow laws).
15. W. E. B. DU BOIS, THE NEGRO IN BUSINESS 7 (1899).
16. See Robert L. Boyd, Demographic Change and Entrepreneurial Occupations: African Americans
in Northern Cities, 55 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 129, 129 (1996) (asserting that demographic changes led to a
decline in African American businesses serving White populations and an increase in serving African
American populations); Martin Ruef & Angelina Grigoryeva, Jim Crow, Ethnic Enclaves, and Status
Attainment: Occupational Mobility among U.S. Blacks, 1880-1940, 124 AM. J. SOC. 814, 817 (2018)
(stating that under Jim Crow, Black people had to develop a “group economy” based on their forced
ethnic enclaves).
17. See generally Joseph William Singer, Property and Sovereignty Imbricated: Why Religion is not
an Excuse to Discriminate in Public Accommodations, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 519, 542 (2017)
(noting that “a public accommodation is, by definition, open to the public,” which means that “[p]ublic
accommodations extend a general invitation to the public to come in and do business” without being able
to “choose which customers to serve”). But as I argue in Part III, it is not clear that this analysis is
ultimately right in imputing a “general invitation to the public” to the owner without begging the essential
question. After all, owners had, and in some places can still have, the legal privilege to decide how
inclusive their invitation should be. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-17 (2019). In imputing inclusive
intentions, Singer’s analysis assumes away the very conflict it purports to explain and resolve. For recent
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fail to make good on their undertaking. The undertaking at issue is egalitarian in
the sense that these providers make their facilities all-inclusive. There are two
ways to understand the argument from an egalitarian undertaking perspective.
One might be a factual observation about the actions and intentions of actual
providers. Another might also be a conceptual argument concerning the nature
of the role occupied by those engaging in the business of service and good
provision.
That said, neither the former nor the latter is true. Concerning the factual
observation, the reality that some providers are motivated by egalitarian
commitments does not make it the case that service- and good-providers as such
are so motivated. A better interpretation of why antidiscrimination law exists in
the first place is that many providers could refuse, and have refused, to adopt an
egalitarian stance. If anything, it seems that sellers, and buyers, may often be
motivated not so much by egalitarian commitments but rather by their interest in
advancing their own well-being, broadly conceived to include material and
aspirational aspects. Concerning the conceptual understanding of the
undertaking at issue, the notion that there is a built-in feature of egalitarianism
in the service- or good-provider context is difficult to sustain. The difficulty lies
in characterizing the link between egalitarianism and the role of a seller in
conceptual or foundational (or Platonic) terms.18 It is one thing to say that
discriminatory serving or selling practices are unjustified; quite another to say
that they do not count as serving or selling at all. The trouble with discrimination
by providers is not one of overstepping the role of the provider but rather that of
(wrongful) discrimination.
D. Are Service- and Good-Providers Public Entities?
Another familiar, but ultimately mistaken, distinction is between private and
public (or quasi-public) entities. The argument to which it gives rise is that
antidiscrimination law is a creature of public law so that its proper scope of
application covers only public officials or those who partially act on behalf, or in
the service, of the public.19 By contrast, a private person is at liberty to pick and

support, on grounds of formal equality, for the egalitarianism underlying commercial practices of offermaking, see PETER BENSON, JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS 466 (2019).
18. Plato’s idea of professionalism underlies his argument as to why the guardians should not have
private property. It can support viewing providers as public actors in nature. Cf. Jonny Thakkar, Public
and Private Ownership in Plato and Aristotle, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PRIVATIZATION
(Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel eds., forthcoming 2021). However, it is not clear whether this argument
can successfully re-describe commercial providers operating in a liberal society in terms of public officials.
I do not deny the possibility of redescribing lawyers as public officials (officers of the court or so forth).
Instead, my skepticism focuses on the possibility of generalizing about commercial providers from the
special cases of lawyers and physicians.
19. See Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility 2.0 (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). For an earlier (and different) development of an argument that
providers of “necessities” owe antidiscrimination duties in virtue of occupying the traditional, commonlaw position of public accommodations, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292–93 (1996).
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choose whether to be a party to a commercial or an employment transaction—
this is her freedom of, and from, contract.20 For present purposes, suffice it to say
that the commercial transactions on which my argument focuses, and to which
antidiscrimination law applies, concern private entities on either side of the
commercial or employment transaction; neither entity acts as a public official,
and both pursue their own (read, private) ends, subject to constraints.
E. A Legal Right to do Moral Wrong?
The asymmetry at issue also does not align with familiar substantive
considerations. In particular, it is false to suppose that antidiscrimination duties
bear more heavily on the autonomy of the consumer or employee than that of
the seller or employer. Accordingly, the one-sidedness of antidiscrimination law
cannot be explained by resort to the consumer’s right to wrong sellers. The
supposition I reject is two-fold: That the seller’s autonomy interest necessarily,
or overwhelmingly, comes down to its economic aspects (that is, profit
maximization); and that the consumer’s or employee’s autonomy interest
necessarily, or overwhelmingly, encompasses non-economic aspects as well (to
be sure, for many employees work is indeed irreducible to its economic returns).
Both parts hold only contingently; neither captures what is necessarily true.
Certainly, the autonomy interests of some sellers and employers cannot be
identified with profit maximization only—I suspect that many of them find
deeper meaning in pursuing a business leadership role, for example. And the
autonomy interests of consumers and employees need not extend beyond the
brute economic aspects of consuming a mundane good and getting paid to make
ends meet, respectively—I suspect that this characterization fits a non-trivial class
of consumers and employees nowadays. And yet, antidiscrimination law displays
uncompromising indifference to such intricacies. That is, consumers and
employees are kept outside the purview of the antidiscrimination duties that their
counterparties do, with some exceptions, owe them.21
To conclude, it is not surprising, based on the preceding discussion, that
contemporary reactions to the asymmetric structure of antidiscrimination law
range from hostility, to puzzlement, to grudging acceptance.22 This state of affairs
makes it tempting to look for instrumental and inescapably tentative
explanations—excuses, really—for distinguishing between parties whose
discriminatory behavior is deemed wrongful and those whose similarly morally
repugnant and harmful behavior counts as perfectly legal. For instance, epistemic
difficulties in proving discrimination by consumers and employees may be argued
20. Elsewhere, I argue that both propositions—that commercial entities are quasi-public officials
and that private persons are necessarily free to discriminate—are false, doctrinally and normatively
speaking. See Dagan & Dorfman, Justice, supra note 6, at 183.
21. Religion-based discrimination by sellers can, and in many liberal-leaning jurisdictions does, give
rise to a legal wrongdoing; a similarly motivated discrimination by consumers does not. See 42 U.S.C §
2000a(a) (prohibiting religious discrimination against consumers).
22. For instance, the sources cited supra note 9 exhibit, at different points, some or all of these
reactions.
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as a reason of this purely contingent nature. By contrast, my ambition is to
consider, on principled grounds, what might justify the asymmetric structure of
antidiscrimination law. My answer has two parts. On the one hand, in Part III, I
defend a liberal case for the legality of discrimination by the likes of consumers
and employees insofar as they make their transactions bilaterally structured. On
the other, Part IV shows that this case cannot justify relieving consumers and
employees of antidiscrimination duties insofar as they engage in a multilateral
transaction structure.
III
A LIMITED CASE FOR THE LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION: FREE AGENCY
The asymmetric application of antidiscrimination law is independent from the
economic conditions of the market as well as from the conceptions of the good of
its participants. However, it is not independent from the transaction structure. In
particular, it is not independent from the distinction between bilateral and
multilateral transaction structures. A bilateral structure—consisting of a one-off
buying decision—explains why a morally repugnant act of discrimination on the
part of the consumer may not give rise to a legal wrong. I argue that this
explanation finds its grounds in a basic liberal commitment to recognizing
persons as free agents. And since it goes to the structure of the interaction, it does
not turn on the specific conception of the good of either party in the interaction;
nor does it make essential reference to the actual economic conditions of the
market in which the parties interact (say, whether or not sellers are economic
Goliaths and consumers are Davids). As I explain in Part IV, however, the case
for the legality of discrimination does not hold for consumers engaging in
multilateral transactions—that is, seeking the purchase of a certain good from
any one seller.
I will use consumer-side discrimination as my stock example; in particular, I
focus on a clear case of discriminatory behavior, racial discrimination, so as to set
aside considerations that might unnecessarily complicate the discussion.23 The
analysis and conclusions, however, can be extended (as I suggest in Part IV) to

23. By using this case, I can leave for another occasion the question of precisely what forms of
discriminatory behavior should count as morally and legally wrongful. One aspect of this question is what
to make of the numerus clausus of protected groups found in many statutory prohibitions on
discrimination—in particular, does this restriction reflect a foundational commitment to protect a limited
class of traits and characteristics against discriminatory behavior? Elsewhere I argue this in the negative.
See generally Dagan & Dorfman, Justice, supra note 6. The restriction is better viewed as reflecting an
institutional concern: The transition from morality to legality brings rule-of-law considerations into the
picture. Most importantly, law must provide effective guidance to owners of places of public
accommodation precisely because they are legally empowered, qua owners, to fix other peoples’
normative situations. Resorting to clear categories of protected traits helps to defuse the potentially
intrusive and demanding aspects of the duty to include. In that, the numerus clausus methodology in and
around antidiscrimination laws establish an intersubjective frame of reference that is capable of guiding
participants’ deliberation and behavior by minimizing resort to individualized knowledge and radically
ad hoc judgments. Id. at 176.

FINAL - DORFMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2020 8:06 PM

184

[Vol. 83:175

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

the cases of employees and home-seekers engaging in discriminatory behavior.24
Consider a White supremacist who decides to dine out but returns home upon
learning that the restaurant he entered was owned and managed by a non-White
person. There is no other underlying reason for his refusal to dine there other
than that of plain bigotry—neither the cost of the food nor the quality of the food
or service plays any role in his decision.
While the White supremacist’s discriminatory behavior is certainly morally
repugnant, I argue that it should not count as a legal wrong within a liberal legal
order. The argument commences with the observation that his behavior lacks a
wrongful act apart from the immoral motive it exhibits. The outward act of
refraining from either accepting the owner’s offer or responding to the owner’s
invitation to make an offer is innocent—offer or invitation to make an offer of
this sort is non-committal. People may decline, not to mention forgo, this offer or
invitation to make an offer on any number of perfectly legitimate grounds. They
may decide that they are no longer interested in dining out, that they cannot
afford it, that they should rush back home, and so on. This is the sense in which
the very act of forgoing fails to exhibit genuine wrongfulness. What distinguishes
the bigot from these other people is, therefore, not the brute act associated with
declining the offer (or the invitation to make an offer) extended by the restaurant
owner, but rather his hostile attitude toward the owner’s identity.
This is not to say that attitudes and motives must always remain beyond the
reach of liberal legal orders. In fact, liberal legal regimes do, and should, consider
attitudes and motives insofar as their outward manifestations are illegitimate in
and of themselves. Liberal legal orders do that, say, in connection with torts such
as fraud and, most straightforwardly, crimes requiring mens rea. In these
instances, attitudes and motives figure prominently in the decision to impose
liability and in determining its appropriate scope.25 But the reason for taking a
profound interest in illicit attitudes cannot be specified apart from the outwardly
wrongful acts that accompany these attitudes—for instance, the act inducing
another person to rely on one’s knowingly false representation can hardly be redescribed as non-wrongful.
The question I pose is, rather, can attitudes alone serve as a basis for deeming
a private person’s act of declining an invitation or offer illegal? Conceptually
speaking, this is surely a possibility all too common in the lived experience of
totalitarian regimes. There, disloyalty is fundamentally a failure to adopt the right
attitude toward the ruler—this is why law enforcement agencies in these states
are often described as thought police (or Thinkpol in George Orwell’s parlance).
Some religions have advanced a somewhat similar interest in the independent
24. See infra Part IV.
25. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 cmt. c (1977) (noting that an action for
fraudulent misrepresentation will lie if, among other things, “the actor either acts with the desire to cause
it or acts believing that there is a substantial certainty that the result will follow from his conduct”), with
id. § 552 cmt. a (noting that, with respect to negligent misrepresentation, “[w]hen there is no intent to
deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of the maker of the misrepresentation is
sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for its consequences”).
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significance of people’s attitudes—the various inquisition campaigns pursued by
the Catholic Church during the middle ages targeted souls, rather than merely
outward acts of religious conformity.26
That said, making attitudes dispositive is not a valid option for a liberal legal
order.27 Holding a person legally responsible for acquiring morally unacceptable
motives or attitudes while executing a perfectly legitimate act contrasts with a
liberal principle of recognizing private persons as free agents. Indeed, imposing
adverse legal consequences on account of one’s attitude alone undermines free
agency as it denies the opportunity to act on the basis of a more appropriate
attitude by revising the current one.
Note that the opportunity to revise need not be restricted to the act of refusal
itself (which would reduce the act of revising to that of accepting the restaurant’s
invitation or offer). Rather, it can also make the same act of refusal accompanied
by a revised attitude. For instance, our bigot may decide not to order food from
the restaurant based on a perfectly legitimate reason. In this scenario, his
disapproving attitude toward the owner’s identity no longer bears on the
decision—for example, he may refuse based on financial grounds. This view of
revisability in the domain of motives or attitudes reflects a principled
commitment on the part of a liberal legal order to recognize people as free agents
and, so, as persons capable of changing their minds (or attitudes).
The preceding analysis finds ample support, and further elucidation, in the
civil and criminal law of some respectable liberal legal orders. For instance, it
figures prominently in the leading case of Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles.28 There,
the defendant prevented percolating water from entering the plaintiff’s
neighboring reservoir in order to force the latter to buy the defendant’s land at a
high price.29 The court denied liability because malice alone could not render
legally wrongful a legitimate act of using one’s land to capture percolating
26. The Forced Baptism of Jews in Christian Europe: An Introductory Overview, in
CHRISTIANIZING PEOPLES AND CONVERTING INDIVIDUALS 157, 163 (Guyda Armstrong & Ian N.
Wood eds., 2000) (noting that “the aim of the Inquisition was to obtain confession, and then to impose
the appropriate penance in order to reconcile the accused with the church and save their mortal soul”).
27. It may be tempting to read Oliver Wendell Holmes as suggesting that mere malice can figure as
an independent ground for legal liability. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 163–67 (2016)
(interpreting Holmes’s account of malice as being “prima facie wrongful to intend to inflict a loss on
another person,” therefore leading to the conclusion that, in Ripstein’s view, Holmes asserted that
actually “causing or intending harm are the basic categories of tort law”). I do not believe that this was
Holmes’s suggestion, though. Holmes developed the view that harming another person, rather than
infringing her rights, is what grounds tort liability—he explicitly characterized “temporal damages” as an
“evil,” and asserted that causing a foreseeable evil triggers liability unless “special grounds” either
privilege or excuse the injurer. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV.
1, 3, 4–5, 7 (1894). For this reason, Holmes’s analysis of maliciously causing “temporal damage” to
another person combines morally unacceptable motive with an act causing “evil” consequences. In other
words, malice does not offer a freestanding reason for the law to impose liability even for Holmes.
Rather, he invoked it to defeat a privilege the defendant would have had to cause temporal damage had
he not acted with malice. Roughly speaking, malice was, for Holmes, akin to abuse of a privilege to cause
evil, rather than a ground of liability. See id. at 9.
28. Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.).
29. Id. at 595.
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water.30 But perhaps the most vivid instantiation of the free agency principle
developed above arises in connection with criminal law, where it is well
established that the mere “imagination of the mind” is not punishable.31 This
point is brought home most vividly by criminal law’s doctrine of locus
poenitentiae, under which mere preparations to engage in a criminal act cannot
trigger liability: The reason is that the space, the locus, between preparing and
completing a criminal enterprise reflects the recognition of the actor as a free
agent and, so, as someone who could—rather than merely would—change his or
her mind before consummating the crime.32
One might suspect that the rationale for this principle is, at bottom, purely
epistemic, picking out the familiar problem of unverifiability. This suspicion is
not without merits, as many everyday cases of discrimination by consumers occur
off the legal radar.33 Although at the operational level it can sometimes be
difficult to ascertain the content of one’s attitudes and their weight in the decision
to decline an invitation to make offers, the deeper issue is substantive, rather than
epistemic. Once again, it is about the normative implications—in terms of
recognizing persons as free agents—of denying people the opportunity to act on
the basis of more appropriate attitudes by revising the current ones. Hence,
recognizing what responsible agents could do does not rest on what they would
do (or even would most likely do).34 Accordingly, the non-epistemic case for
sustaining an arena of revisability remains firm even in the face of a perfectly
credible, publicly-conveyed announcement never to enter a transaction with a
place owned, say, by this or that person.35
Must a similar analysis apply in the case of the restaurant owner? Not
necessarily and, typically, not at all. Extending an arena of revisability to the
discriminating owner opens up only two possible courses of action: The owner
can either refrain from discrimination or close down his business.
To see this, I will focus on a simple case featuring a White supremacist
restaurant owner who refuses to serve a non-White customer in good standing
during the restaurant’s normal hours of operation. In order not to prejudge the
30. Id. What about legal systems that recognize abuse of rights? My (normative) argument is that
even then it is inappropriate to impose adverse legal consequences under these circumstances because
doing so denies one the free agency underlying the ability to change one’s mind.
31. Hales v. Petit [1562] 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 397 (C.B. 1562).
32. See R. A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
191, 202 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (explaining that locus poenitentiae gives reason to “limit the law of
nonconsummate offenses to ‘last-act’ cases”).
33. On epistemic difficulties of this sort, see IAN AYRES, PRIVATE PREJUDICE?
UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE ON RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 127–36 (2001).
34. This is true, once again, in the analogous case of criminal law’s distinction between mere
preparations and criminal acts. A nice illustration is the Spielberg film MINORITY REPORT (20th Century
Fox 2002).
35. The space of revisability need not be confined to motives or attitudes formed prior to the
decisive act of refusal. In principle, it may capture a sincere change of motive that occurs after the fact.
That is, a repugnant motive underlying an otherwise perfectly appropriate act of refusing to rent a
wedding venue from an owner could, on reflection, be repudiated and supplanted by a legitimate motive
(say, concerning economic costs or aesthetics).
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question, the refusal should be considered legal—this may be so if the case
predated the Civil Rights revolution, because current antidiscrimination law does
not apply to sole proprietors,36 or simply because there is no such legal obligation
at all.37 Further suppose that the customer is in good standing in the sense that he
or she fully complies with all the housekeeping requirements set out by the
restaurant owner. These requirements are meant to reflect uncontroversial
prerequisites such as not violating the (morally sound) criminal law, treating the
restaurant’s employees and other customers with appropriate respect, and so on.
Normal hours of operation are just another housekeeping rule. Properly
conceived, housekeeping requirements exclude non-conforming customers on
uncontroversial grounds in the sense that they do not, in fact, sustain
impermissible exclusionary rules (say, enforcing a particular dress code may
indirectly but effectively, and illegitimately, target certain populations).38
Against this background, the restaurant owner’s refusal does not leave a
critical gap between the act and its underlying motive or attitude. The outward
act of not inviting one class of people to dine cannot be a surface manifestation
of perfectly legitimate grounds. Rather, it is an act of racial discrimination against
them. The reason why this case cannot reasonably be re-described to reflect a
legitimate attitude is that the restaurant owner has already expressed and acted
on his commitment to inviting people, including strangers who do not share the
owner’s bigotry, to trade with him. His undertaking makes the act of refusing to
trade with non-White people the unequivocal upshot of hostile motives or
attitudes. It precludes the possibility of attributing the refusal to serve non-White
people to considerations that arise independently of his hostility toward dealing
with these people.39 That is, his undertaking eliminates the arena of revisability
since there is no non-hostile motive that could correspond with his decision to
refrain from serving Black people.40 Instead, he can either invite the latter to dine
or shun service entirely.
To be sure, my analysis does not turn on whether the owner’s voluntary
undertaking takes the form of an offer, which would mean that the owner

36. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not distinguish between sole-proprietors and
corporations for the purpose of determining what a place of public accommodation is. However, it does
not seem to subject retailers (say, as opposed to hotels, restaurants, and cafeterias) to the Act’s purview.
See 42 U.S.C § 2000a(b)(1)–(4) (2018); Singer, supra note 19, at 1288 (stating that “retail stores, after the
Civil War, were not thought to be public accommodations”).
37. The latter is currently upheld by Mississippi law. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-17 (2019). See also
Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 711, 716 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (holding that Miss. H.B. 1523 (2016) is
unconstitutional), rev’d on other grounds, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding no standing).
38. See also Fair Housing Act, 45 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2018) (“Nothing in this subsection requires
that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the
property of others.”)
39. To be sure, whether or not these considerations count as legitimate depends on their correct
characterization, rather than on the owner’s subjective view of them.
40. By saying no non-hostile motive, I include motives that are facially neutral but that, in truth,
conceal hostile ones.
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undertakes to defer to the discretionary right of customers to accept that offer.
In some commercial cases, the undertaking at issue takes the form of offering the
goods or services for sale, in which case a customer is entitled to bind the owner
to a contract by accepting the offer. However, under the appropriate context,
some commercial undertakings are better seen as instances of inviting customers
to make offers, in which case the owner reserves the right to accept (or decline)
the deal. Nothing in my argument turns on the context-driven distinction between
an offer and invitation to treat or trade. For even a restaurant owner whose act
takes the form of inviting cannot reasonably re-describe the refusal of all and only
offers made by non-White people as exhibiting non-hostile motives or attitudes.
That is, his undertaking ultimately to transact with everyone except for nonWhites precludes the possibility of driving a wedge between the act of refusing to
deal with non-White people and the hostile attitude toward dealing with them.
IV
ELABORATION: ON THE SCOPE OF THE FREE AGENCY CASE
I now wish to move from the paradigm case of consumer discrimination to the
more general characterization of the liberal case for the legality of discrimination
in the market context. In particular, the argument going forward addresses two
basic questions: First, what might generate the different implications of
discrimination made by consumers, on the one hand, and by providers, on the
other; and second, what is the scope of the liberal case for discrimination’s
legality, by which I mean who should be relieved of antidiscrimination duties?
These two questions are intimately related so that the answer to the former
informs, in some measure, the answer to the latter.
The discussion in the preceding Part answers the first question. Again, the
structure of the interaction is the source of the difference between the legal
implications of consumer discrimination vis-à-vis provider discrimination. The
key inquiry is whether one’s transactional undertaking eliminates the gap
between an act and its accompanying attitude so that a subsequent refusal to
interact unequivocally manifests a hostile attitude. The undertaking at issue,
recall, can take the form of making an offer, though even an invitation to make
an offer suffices. On this analysis, the commercial engagement between the
consumer and the provider need not feature equally situated parties: The
provider has formed intentions to engage in some commercial dealings with
certain buyers; however, unlike the consumer, the provider has also specifically
acted on these intentions by making or inviting offers. This asymmetry in
consumer–provider interaction matters because the free agency of the former,
rather than the latter, is at stake. Whereas the consumer can revise the hostile
attitude underlying her refusal to interact with the other party, the provider may
not. Deeming the consumer’s refusal legally wrongful fails to recognize her as a
free agent, that is, as a person capable of acting on the basis of a revised, nonhostile attitude.
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A. Limiting and Extending the Scope of the Case
Characterizing the asymmetry between the consumer and the retailer in terms
of the structure of their interaction provides the normative resources with which
to answer the second question concerning the scope of the case for the legality of
discrimination. Two propositions follow from identifying the structure of the
interaction as key: First, that the case for the legality of discrimination does not
apply to all cases of consumer discrimination; and second, that this case could
apply not only to consumer markets but also, under the appropriate
circumstances, to transactions in employment and housing markets.41 Hence, the
analysis of the stock example of consumer–provider interaction should be limited
to a certain kind of discrimination by consumers but, at the same time, extended
beyond the category of consumers, or even buyers, to capture other market actors
whose acts of refusing to engage in certain transactions could admit of non-hostile
attitudes toward their transactees. I take each of these claims in turn.
1. Bilateral and Multilateral Transaction Structures: A Limitation
The free agency case for the legality of discrimination turns on the existence
of an arena of revisability in the domain of attitudes. The scope of this case should
therefore track this arena’s existence. I argue that a certain distinction between
bilateral and multilateral transaction structures determines the existence
question and, therefore, also the scope of the case of discrimination’s legality. A
transaction has a bilateral structure for the consumer when it features a one-off
plan to purchase a thing. Its bilaterality reflects the fact that the consumer’s plan
comes down to a choice between, on the one hand, purchasing that thing here
and now and, on the other, forgoing the purchase. That, recall, was my stock
example in Part III—a White supremacist who returns to his home upon learning
that the restaurant he has just entered is owned by a non-White person. By
contrast, a transaction is multilateral in its structure when the consumer’s choice
features a class-wide dimension so that deciding not to purchase from one seller
is immediately supplanted by a decision to consider buying the thing from
another seller. Thus, the consumer’s plan involves choosing among providers of
a thing, rather than merely whether or not to have this thing.42 Thus, the White
supremacist would not merely forgo dining out, but rather find an alternative
restaurant that better suits his racist preferences.43
What is the significance of the bilateral–multilateral distinction? Most
importantly, it places a principled constraint on the free agency argument for
discrimination’s legality. An arena of revisability works if, and only if, consumers
41. My present discussion is limited to commercial interactions only. It is possible, I believe, to
extend the analysis to certain non-commercial interpersonal interactions as well. I leave this possibility
to another occasion.
42. It should be clear by now that my talk of bilateral and multilateral transaction structures
concerns economic, rather than juridical or legal, forms.
43. I shall assume that those engaging in the business of selling and employing typically structure
their transactions multilaterally—as I argue below, this assumption need not hold with respect to
consumers, employees, and house-seekers.
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adopt a bilateral transaction structure. That is, the outward act of refusing to buy
does not necessarily presuppose an underlying illicit attitude. A free agent could
so act on the basis of a revised attitude, including, in particular, a non-illicit one.
By contrast, no such arena of revisability works when consumers adopt a
multilateral transaction structure. There, the act of refusing to transact, say, with
one provider of a generic good, becomes the unequivocal manifestation of an
illicit attitude toward him or her. Buying the same good from another, otherwise
identical provider eliminates the possibility of justifying the refusal to buy from
the former on legitimate grounds.44 Hence, the argument from free agency cannot
make good on discrimination that arises in the course of engaging in transactions
of a multilateral structure. By implication, relieving consumers of
antidiscrimination duties under these circumstances should be understood as
resting on instrumental and, so, necessarily contingent arguments. Contrary to
the bilateral transaction structure, its multilateral counterpart could provide no
more than a conditional protection from the demands of antidiscrimination law.
For instance, if the difficulty of verifying consumer discrimination explains
current reluctance to impose liability, then no such reluctance is warranted when
the epistemic difficulty at issue becomes sufficiently negligible (as when
consumers, home-seekers, or employees make their market choices based on a
smart phones apps’ built-in discriminatory characteristics).45
Deploying the bilateral–multilateral distinction to determine the scope of the
free agency case for discrimination’s legality generates an implementation
challenge. The challenge is one of making antidiscrimination law adequately
responsive to the normative implications of distinguishing bilateral from
multilateral transaction structures. And it is anything but straightforward. An
adequate response will have to resist ad hoc implementation of the bilateral–
multilateral distinction without thereby obscuring it. Ad hoc implementation
should be resisted because it undermines some of the rule-of-law’s values, such
as guidance. Adopting the opposite extreme of ignoring the difference between
bilateral and multilateral transaction structures fares no better as it undermines
the very distinction at issue. Indeed, the bilateral–multilateral distinction leads to
contrasting normative judgments concerning the legality and illegality of
discrimination, respectively. Treating all instances of consumer discrimination as
either legal or illegal necessarily fails to appreciate the argument for free agency
and its limit. Both transaction structures figure prominently in the lived
experience of consumers, so there is no reason to marginalize either one.
Certainly, multilateral transaction structures are ubiquitous. So too are bilateral
ones. Indeed, consumers often find themselves contemplating a one-off
44. The situation I consider in the main text is one in which the consumer’s sole motivation for
refusal is illicit one. I set to one side both in-between cases of mixed motives (involving illicit and nonillicit ones) and non-discriminatory cases (involving purely legitimate reasons to prefer purchasing from
one provider than the other).
45. For more on the growing resort to apps (and other online tools) and their discriminatory
implications in the housing markets context, see Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 349, 403–06 (2017).
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transaction (say, going on a shopping spree); home-seekers may sometimes
pursue their one and only dream house; some job-seekers may be willing to give
up the independence of self-employment for the sake of joining a specific firm.
Against this backdrop, the argument for free agency supports a bifurcated
antidiscrimination law. The organizing question is not an all-or-nothing one
concerning whether consumers should owe, or be relieved of, antidiscrimination
duties. Rather, because they should sometimes owe and at other times be relieved
of these duties, the live question—the challenge mentioned above—is how to
implement this dualism in the practice of antidiscrimination law. I leave this
challenging question to another occasion.
This way of identifying what might be the (limited) case for discrimination’s
legality should be contrasted with the autonomy-based argument for and against
relieving consumers of antidiscrimination duties. The key distinction of the freeagency account I have been developing in these pages is a formal one, as it
concerns the difference between bilateral and multilateral transaction structures.
By contrast, the autonomy-based case for the legality (or illegality) of
discrimination turns on the substantive distinction between transactions based on
their contribution to the participant’s autonomy—for example, the identity of a
generic goods provider may have very little impact on the autonomy of the buyer
and, so, makes no compelling case for relieving the latter of antidiscrimination
duties. This approach confronts a very difficult challenge, though: It is not clear
how autonomy can launder a morally wrongful discrimination in a market setting
simply by saying that doing wrong proves very beneficial to the wrongdoer’s
autonomy. The free-agency case that I prefer faces no such difficulty as it appeals
to a more fundamental concern about law’s impact on freedom and
responsibility—liberalism’s commitment to respecting the basic capacity to
change one’s mind.
2. Asymmetry in Reverse Order: An Extension
Because it is grounded in a concern for free agency, the limited case for the
legality of discrimination need not single out consumers or buyers whose
transactions are bilaterally structured. The labor market can render this point
more vivid: Discrimination by “sellers” of labor does not count as illegal, whereas
discrimination by its “buyers” is typically deemed legally wrongful.46 To be sure,
I do not suggest that buying labor is the exact same commercial activity, say, as
purchasing commodities and services. Rather, I assume that the formal
similarities are substantial enough to characterize recruiting practices as in some
measure instances of buying labor.
Now consider the case of an employer inviting potential candidates to make
employment offers or making employment offers to candidates. Either way, a
decision to make the invitation or offer only to White people implicates the
employer in the same situation in which the restaurant owner, acting as a seller,
is willing to make commercial transactions with everyone save for non-White
46. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2018).
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consumers. The employer’s refusal to hire certain people on account of their race
does not leave a critical gap between this act and its underlying hostile attitude.
That is, the discriminatory act cannot be a surface manifestation of perfectly
legitimate grounds. Rather, it is an act of racial discrimination against potential
candidates. The only ways for the employer to revise his or her hostile attitude
are to either treat Black candidates with equal respect or refrain from hiring new
employees entirely.47 On this account, prohibiting discrimination by employers
does not undermine the law’s respect for the free agency of the employer.
On the other hand, the gap between an employee’s hostile attitude toward
Black employers and his ultimate act of declining the invitation made by these
employers may sometimes parallel the bilateral transaction structure of the
White supremacist consumer facing a one-off choice concerning dining out at a
restaurant owned by a Black person. The parallel in question does not concern
simultaneous submissions of job applications to multiple employers, which is to
say a multilateral transaction structure. Rather, it concerns a one-off attempt at
getting a job offer from a particular firm (because only employment in this firm
can be as attractive as self-employment, it is the only firm in the candidate’s field
of expertise, or any other reason motivating a bilateral transaction structure).
Against this backdrop, declining the employer’s invitation can be a manifestation
of any number of non-hostile attitudes, which means that the employee could
act—accept or decline the Black employer’s invitation or offer—on the basis of
a more appropriate attitude by revising the hostile one. Hence, respect for this
employee’s free agency requires the existence of an arena of revisability; it
supports the legality of discrimination by employees.
The case of employment-related discrimination shows, among other things,
that the legality of discrimination does not turn on occupying the role of the
buyer—employers are not, and should not, be relieved of general
antidiscrimination duties. This conclusion is not peculiar to labor markets, to be
sure. Indeed, it can be replicated in markets for goods or services. Begin with a
concrete case: competitive bidding for services. There, the buyer of goods or
services invites offers from various manufacturers, distributors, or serviceprovides (who occupy the positions of potential sellers, in which case it is the
buyer who gets to decide whose offer merits acceptance). The asymmetric
structure in such situations puts the auctioneer-buyer in a position similar to
those of the restaurant owner and the employer. By undertaking to invite bids
from non-Black service providers, the buyer makes its act of restricting the
invitation an unequivocal outward manifestation of a hostile attitude toward
Black people. And in contrast, a service-provider declining on racist grounds to
take the bid could keep himself off the bid, but this time on the basis of a revised,
legitimate motive.
The example of competitive bidding can be generalized so as to explain the
broader category of firms making buying offers to, or inviting buying offers from,
47. Treating these candidates with respect is not inconsistent with setting uncontroversial
housekeeping rules, say, against hiring unqualified workers. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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potential sellers. Take, for instance, a car dealer who offers to buy cars from
vehicle owners, including past clients. The dealer’s role in such a transaction can
be characterized as a buyer, whereas the car owner, who is typically a private
person, occupies the role of the seller. Suppose the car dealer reaches out with
such an offer, or an invitation to make an offer, but declines to extend it, say, to
potential sellers with qualifying vehicles based solely on their race. At the same
time, consider a potential seller (or a seller class) who refuses to accept the offer
or the invitation based on identical repugnant reasons (which would be the race
of the owner or manager of the dealership). On my analysis, the buyer’s
discriminatory behavior is properly considered legally, not just morally,
wrongful—this is because there is no way for the car dealer to act on the basis of
a non-hostile attitude other than by either eliminating the racist components in
the buy-back program or eliminating the program entirely. By contrast, consider
the circumstances of the car owner, the would-be seller, insofar as he or she is
facing a bilateral transaction structure involving a one-off opportunity for a sellback. Under these circumstances, a car owner may refuse the offer for any
number of legitimate reasons, which means that this owner could, regardless of
whether he or she would, in fact, change his or her mind and act on the basis of a
non-hostile attitude toward the buyer’s race. Deeming the car owner’s immoral
behavior illegal necessarily fails to recognize him or her as a free agent in
precisely this way.
B. Discrimination, Artificial Persons, and Free Agency
The argument has so far sought to explain the asymmetric framework of
antidiscrimination law by uncovering a hitherto overlooked connection between
the structure of market interactions and a certain concern for the free agency of
the interacting parties. From this connection, an important question arises with
respect to the scope of the case for the legality of discrimination: Does it cover
incorporated persons? To start, the analysis has been sufficiently formal and
abstract to accommodate the existence of non-natural market actors of all sorts,
be they buyers or sellers, employers or employees, and so on. Indeed, my focus
on the structure of the interaction makes it conceptually possible to conceive of
either party to an interaction as an incorporated person. That said, the normative
significance of this approach lies in considerations of free agency—more
specifically, that the legal order recognizes the capacity of the parties to manifest
their free agency in the world by revising their attitudes in response to the
demands of the right reason. One might suspect that incorporated persons are far
removed from these considerations or that they are only loosely and indirectly
implicated by such innate capacity. This is because, the objection could go, an
organization does not acquire attitudes or motives of its own and, so, does not
call for an arena of revisability.
It might be protested that a corporation’s discriminatory decision, say, to
refrain from purchasing goods or services from a certain person is not a decision
made purely by an artificial person. As an empirical matter, the corporation’s

FINAL - DORFMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2020 8:06 PM

194

[Vol. 83:175

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

agents who are entitled to speak and act in its name are the ones behind the
decision and, for this purpose, adopt attitudes and motives that characterize such
a decision. Normatively, treating corporations as purely artificial constructs, to
the exclusion of the moral agents who own, run, and work for them, is
counterintuitive at least from a liberal (as opposed to a utilitarian) point of view.
Accordingly, considerations of free agency need not wither away when natural
persons, occupying the roles of owners, managers, and workers, speak and act in
the name of a corporation.
That said, the nature of the connection between organizations and the idea of
agency (properly conceived) remains unclear. Furthermore, addressing it
presupposes an elaborate theory of incorporated persons and the precise
connection between them and the natural persons who function as their owners,
managers, and workers—for instance, should this connection be viewed in terms
of incorporated persons extending the agency of natural persons and, if so, in
what ways and to what extent? These complex questions must be addressed
before we can determine whether or not incorporated persons fall within the
scope of the free-agency case for the legality of discrimination.
V
CONCLUSION
The limited liberal case for the legality of discrimination discussed in these
pages identifies an important connection between the asymmetric structure of
antidiscrimination law and the capacity for free agency, which is part of what it
means for a liberal legal order to respect its constituents, taken separately, as free
and equal agents. It is perhaps plausible to suppose that in a world in which both
sides of every market transaction are subject to antidiscrimination duties, the
chances of suffering discrimination would be lower than in our world in which
these duties fall only one-sidedly. This would not be the only important
divergence between the two worlds, though. In the world with less discrimination,
no one is treated by the law (of antidiscrimination) as an agent capable of acting
on the basis of a revised attitude by responding to the demands of right reason in
a way in which, in our world, everyone holds an entitlement to be treated as such.

